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THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE RHETORICAL 
CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
Michael D. Murray* 
Abstract 
The Great Recession of 2008 and onward has drawn attention to the 
American economic and financial system, and has cast a critical 
spotlight on the theories, policies, and assumptions of the modern, 
neoclassical school of law and economics—often labeled the "Chicago 
School"—because this school of legal economic thought has had great 
influence on the American economy and financial system.  The Chicago 
School's positions on deregulation and the limitation or elimination of 
oversight and government restraints on stock markets, derivative 
markets, and other financial practices are the result of decades of 
neoclassical economic assumptions regarding the efficiency of 
unregulated markets, the near-religious-like devotion to a hyper-
simplified conception of rationality and self-interest with regard to the 
persons and institutions participating in the financial system, and a 
conception of laws and government policies as incentives and costs in a 
manner that excludes the actual conditions and complications of reality. 
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This Article joins the critical conversation on the Great Recession 
and the role of law and economics in this crisis by examining 
neoclassical and contemporary law and economics from the perspective 
of legal rhetoric.  The Great Recession already has caused several of the 
stars of the Chicago School to recant their hardest, most definite 
statements concerning market efficiency and the necessity of non-
regulation and zero government oversight (or interference) in the 
financial system.  The law and economics movement is likely to regroup 
or reform itself under a revised conception of market efficiency, as 
indicated by the chastened admissions of the leaders of the old school, or 
move in the direction of a revised conception of rational choice theory 
represented by the thriving school of behavioral law and economics. In 
order to better understand the law and economics movement now and in 
the future, this Article joins the discussion by pointing out the 
fundamental rhetorical canons of law and economics.  These canons 
have made law and economics a persuasive form of discourse: 
 Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and 
demonstration; 
 The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and 
costs;  
 The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and  
 Rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral 
social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science. 
Law and economics has developed into a school of contemporary 
legal rhetoric with a particular, effective combination of topics of 
invention and arrangement and tropes of style that are relevant to legal 
rhetoric beyond the economic analysis of law.  My Article is the first to 
examine the prescriptive implications of the rhetoric of law and 
economics for general legal discourse as opposed to examining the 
benefits and limitations of the economic analysis of law itself.  This 
Article advances the conversation in two areas: first, as to the study and 
understanding of the persuasiveness of law and economics, particularly 
because that persuasiveness has played a role in influencing American 
economic and financial policy leading up to the Great Recession; and 
second, as to the study and understanding of the use of economic topics 
of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in general legal 
discourse when evaluated in comparison to the other schools of classical 
and contemporary legal rhetoric. My conclusion is that the rhetorical 
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canons of law and economics can be used to create meaning and inspire 
imagination in legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of law, but 
the canons are tools that only are as good as the user, and can be 
corrupted in ways that helped to bring about the current economic crisis.   
INTRODUCTION 
Why has law and economics been so persuasive 
leading up to the Great Recession1? 
 
This article examines law and economics as a school of 
contemporary legal rhetoric with a particular combination of 
rhetorical modes of communication and persuasion—the rhetorical 
canons of law and economics—that have made it persuasive to 
many audiences within and without the legal community.  My goal 
is to critique the rhetoric of the neoclassical and contemporary law 
and economics2 analysis of law, not to examine the benefits or 
costs of the application of one form of economic analysis or 
                                                 
1
  I take the name, “Great Recession,” from none other than Nobel Laureate 
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical 
economic assumptions when he pointed out that “markets do not work well on 
their own” and that in the recent recession, the United States suffered because 
the economy lost its “balance between the role of markets and the role of 
government.”  JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND 
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY xii (2010). 
2
 I use the term “contemporary law and economics” to mean twenty-first 
century law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic 
approaches to the study and analysis of law.  Contemporary law and economics 
has evolved from “new” or “neoclassical” law and economics that developed in 
the 1960s and which applied neoclassical economic principles and 
methodologies to the analysis of law.  New or neoclassical law and economics is 
also referred to as “traditional” or “conventional” law and economics.  See 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal 
Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088 
(1996); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical 
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77, 83, 138 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Donald C. 
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance 
with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73; Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law 
and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical 
Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 470, 470–72 (2007). 
4  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
another in shaping law and social policy.3  I seek to examine law 
and economics as a rhetorical perspective in law so as to reveal and 
demonstrate the combination of rhetorical canons that helped bring 
about the Great Recession.4 
   
                                                 
3
 Not to mention the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency obtained 
through contemporary economic analysis of law. See ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008). 
4
  Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 619 (2001) (“In its 
more extreme forms, law and economics solutions to problems of human 
behavior were paraded as “science” (not as social science but as “science”), the 
findings of which were unassailable. Those who questioned were made to 
appear ignorant or foolish.”); Timothy A. Canova, The Failing Bubble 
Economy: American Exceptionalism and the Crisis in Legitimacy, 102 AM. 
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008) (“Lawyers and legal scholars have tended 
not to question the economic assumptions of orthodox economic models”); 
Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer 2008, at 
41; Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the 
Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622 (2011); Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 171, 173 (2009); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path to 
Corporate Responsibility, in Doreen McBarnet, THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2007).  Even the unofficial dean of the Chicago School, 
Judge Richard Posner, has admitted the connection between neoclassical law 
and economics and present economic crisis.  See RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE 
OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION xii, 270 
(2009) (“We are learning from [the crisis] that we need a more active and 
intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running 
off the rails. . . . [T]he market can be blamed for recessions, which without 
government intervention would often turn into depressions, as they often did 
before the government learned (we thought!) in the after-math of the Great 
Depression how to prevent that from happening.”).  Alan Greenspan, previously 
a staunch advocate of non-regulation of the financial markets, has recently 
recanted his faith in the self-correcting power of free markets.  Alan Greenspan, 
as quoted in EDMUND L. ANDREWS, BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT 
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 65 (2009).  See also Alan Greenspan, The Crisis, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2010, at 3, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_ 
bpea_papers/2010a_bpea_greenspan.pdf).  Critics have noted that the Chicago 
School has worked its effects not only on the United States economy, but 
globally.  See Paul H. Brietzke, Law and Economics Meets the Great Recession 
(2012), copy on file with the author.  
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Rhetoric and law and economics do not often share the same 
paragraph in academic legal writing let alone the same article title,5 
but a central focus of the discipline of law and economics is the 
study of human nature and human behavior6 in order to predict 
what incentives can be communicated to humans that will motivate 
them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common 
goal of rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion.  The 
advocates of the economic analysis of law must persuade their own 
cohorts of the truth of their discoveries, and use the rhetoric of 
their discipline to do so, and also seek to communicate the lessons 
of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal community, 
and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider 
audience.  That law and economics is persuasive beyond the 
confirmed members of the discipline is supported by modern 
history:  critics and supporters alike agree that law and economics 
has established itself as the dominant and most influential 
contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.7   
                                                 
5
 An exception being, Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and 
Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988) [hereinafter McCloskey, Rhetoric of 
Law and Economics], a very useful discussion to which I will refer below. 
6
 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (“law and 
economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about 
actual human behavior”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science] ("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral 
theory, and therein lies its true power."). 
7
 Law and economics’ critics and proponents alike agree that the movement 
has become the most dominant method of legal analysis among legal scholars in 
at least the last fifty years.  See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power 
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142–43 (2003) 
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation], which states:  
The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the 
law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social 
sciences. . . . [T]he flourishing of law and economics [is] undeniable, 
. . . Economic analysis of law . . . has transformed American legal 
thought, . . . [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the legal academy 
6  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is 
persuasive—and not just to legal economists—reveals the 
enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal 
discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the 
discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and 
arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the discourse.  It 
also helps to explain why so many persons in the academy, the 
legal profession, the courts, and government could be persuaded to 
alter the economy and financial system of the United States in 
accordance with the prescriptions of law and economics in ways 
that helped to bring about the Great Recession.   
The topoi and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive 
thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and 
the audience.  For many members of the legal writing discourse 
community—judges, practitioners, government agencies, and 
academics—the modes of persuasion of law and economics can 
provide a critical perspective to construct meaning and improve the 
persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content, 
arrangement, and style.  As such, law and economics rhetoric 
should be recognized as a new school of contemporary rhetoric8 
                                                                                                             
and in the judiciary . . . [making it] the most important development in 
legal scholarship of the twentieth century. 
Id. (inner citations omitted).  See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 
supra note 1, at xix ("[Law and economics is] the foremost interdisciplinary 
field of legal studies”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 
1835, 1836 & n.6 (2005) (law and economics surpasses other movements in 
legal analysis, including law and literature). 
8
 Basic sources on contemporary rhetoric include: PATRICIA BIZZEL & BRUCE 
HERZBERG, THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg 
eds., 1990); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold, 
Rhetoric in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION: 
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959); John 
B. Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of 
Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE (John B. 
Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990); James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary 
Rhetoric, in THE PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred B. Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990);.  See also 
sources cited in notes 7–9, infra. 
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that joins the existing schools—modern argument theory,9 writing 
as a process theory,10 and discourse community theory11—as a lens 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW, 
chs. 2–3, 6–7 (2002); CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE 
NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell 
Weaver trans., 1969); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO 
REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO 
REASONING]; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, 
Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court 
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007) 
(the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is 
the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor 
Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 
(2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); 
Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 139 (2006) 
[hereinafter Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An 
Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80–81 
(2009) [hereinafter Stanchi, Persuasion]. 
10
 See Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing 
Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEGAL WRITING 57 (2000) [hereinafter Berger, 
Reflective Rhetorical Model]; Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal 
Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the 
Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993); 
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of 
Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861 (1995); Carol McCrehan Parker, 
Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to 
Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal 
Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089 (1986); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139. 
11
 See Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to 
In “doctrine” ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary 
on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, 
Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); 
Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking 
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887 (2002); J. Christopher Rideout & 
Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994); 
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is 
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization 
of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998); Joseph M. Williams, On the 
8  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
through which to examine and improve the persuasiveness of legal 
discourse. 
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique 
combination of modes of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi12 
and tropes13 to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its 
audiences:  the priority of mathematical and scientific methods of 
analysis and demonstration, the characterization of legal 
phenomena as incentives and costs, the rhetorical economic 
concept of efficiency, and the lessons of rational choice theory as 
                                                                                                             
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 LEGAL 
WRITING 1 (1991). 
12
 In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = 
“place”) are the “topics” or “subjects” of argument that can be made in various 
situations.  Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis 
[Greek], which may be translated as “invention” or “discovery” of the type of 
argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio 
[Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the argument, which translates as the “arrangement” 
or “organization” or “disposition” of the contents of the argument.  See EDWARD 
P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN 
STUDENT 17, 20, 89–91 (4th ed. 1999); Gabriele Knappe, Classical Rhetoric in 
Anglo-Saxon England, 27 ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998). 
13
 Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio; 
Greek lexis), which pertains to the composition and wording of the discourse, 
including grammar, word choice, and figures of speech. See generally CORBETT 
AND CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra note 10, at 25–26; 
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 129, 133–34 & n.2 (collecting sources 
on style in classical rhetoric).  Figures of speech were divided into tropes 
(creative variations on the meanings of words) and schemes (artful deviations 
from the ordinary arrangements of words).  Linda L. Berger, Studying and 
Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”:  A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 
51 & n.179 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Law as Rhetoric].  Professors Berger, 
Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified tropes as metaphor, 
simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word 
in two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have 
different meanings); periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper 
name or of a proper name for a quality associated with the name); 
personification; hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement); rhetorical 
question; irony; onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox.  CORBETT AND 
CONNORS, supra, note 10, at 395–409; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra, at 51 & 
n.179.  See also MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 199–248 
(metaphors), 328–40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter SMITH, 
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING]. 
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corrected by the empirical studies of behavioral social sciences, 
cognitive studies, and brain science.  My examination of 
contemporary law and economics as a rhetorical perspective 
requires the discussion of the following theses:  
• Law and economics is inherently rhetorical and uses its 
own rhetoric to persuade the members of the law and 
economics discourse community as well as the legal 
community as a whole.   
• Law and economics uses a unique combination of modes of 
persuasion as rhetorical topoi and tropes—the rhetorical 
canons of law and economics—which are:  
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and 
demonstration; 
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives 
and costs,  
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and  
o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern 
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain 
science. 
The rhetorical canons of law and economics alone did not 
cause the Great Recession. Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal 
discourse, not universal goals and not perfect solutions.  Law and 
economics provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author 
might examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse 
regarding the economy, governmental regulation, or any other 
topic of the law.  But a lens, like any other tool, is only as good as 
its user.  My conclusion is that the rhetorical canons of law and 
economics can be used to create meaning and inspire imagination 
in legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of law, but the 
choice to employ the canons must be made with regard to the 
rhetorical concept of ethos and the needs, demands, and limitations 
of the rhetorical situation at hand.   
10  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
I. THE RHETORICAL NATURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. Law and Economics is Inherently Rhetorical 
Law and economics, like all disciplines of academic inquiry 
and study, uses rhetoric to explain and justify its assumptions, 
models, paradigms, assertions, and predictions.14  To understand 
the assertion represented by the sub-heading of this section—law 
and economics is inherently rhetorical—one must understand the 
nature of rhetoric:  Rhetoric is the “discovery and transmission of 
insight and knowledge.”15  Rhetoric is the discipline that examines 
“ways of winning others over to our views, and of justifying those 
views to ourselves as well as others, when the question of how 
things in the world ought to work is contested or contestable.”16 
                                                 
14
 See McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 760.  As 
one scholar states: 
[W]e are now invited to think hard about the rhetoric of everything; 
“the rhetoric of philosophy,” “the rhetoric of sociology,” “the rhetoric 
of religion,” even “the rhetoric of science.”  Though these rhetorics are 
not all of the same kind, we should realize that all of these fields 
depend on rhetoric in their arguments.  Most of them are in fact 
grappling with rhetorical issues, as they debate their professional 
claims.  
WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC: THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE 
COMMUNICATION xii (2004) [hereinafter BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC] 
(emphasis in original). 
15
 Francis J. Mootz, III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal 
Argumentation, and The Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 
317 (1999) (quoting Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language, 
107 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N AM. 348 (1992)).  See also James 
Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and 
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as 
Rhetoric]: 
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something 
rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and 
among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others 
in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to 
somebody, and speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes 
place with given materials. 
Id. 
16
 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7.  See also White, Law as Rhetoric, 
supra note 13, at 684 (rhetoric establishes, maintains, and transforms the 
community and the culture); James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of 
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“Rhetoric is primarily a verbal, situationally contingent, epistemic 
art that is both philosophical and practical and gives rise to 
potentially active texts.”17  Much of the scholarly attention within 
the discipline of rhetoric has been directed to effective 
communication with a particular focus on techniques for 
persuasive communication and argumentation; thus, many familiar 
definitions of rhetoric revolve around persuasion in discourse.18   
In this Article, I am referring to the academic study of rhetoric, 
both in its classical19 and contemporary20 forms.  Rhetoric as the 
                                                                                                             
the Practice of Law, February 14, 2002 Roundtable Discussion, 53 MERCER L. 
REV. 1087, 1090 (2002) (“[T]he minute we begin to think and talk about 
anything at all we live in the world of language, a world of contingent resources 
for thought and speech, and rhetoric is a perfectly good term for how we do 
that.”). 
17
 William A. Covino & David A. Joliffe, What is Rhetoric?, in RHETORIC: 
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, BOUNDARIES 5 (1995). 
18
 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 1355B 
(George A. Kennedy trans., 1991); ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. 1, ch. 2 (W. 
Rhys Roberts trans. 1965), available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/ 
Rhetoric/ (last accessed Nov. 22, 2010) (Lee Honeycutt ed.) [hereinafter 
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC] (“Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.”); JOHN J. 
MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE: COMMUNICATING IDEAS AND 
ATTITUDES 9 (3d ed. 1984) (“Rhetoric is defined ‘as the process of human 
communication in which a speaker sorts, selects, and sends symbols for the 
specific purpose of evoking a precise response’ from an audience.”); KRISTEN K. 
ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 9 (2009) [hereinafter ROBBINS-
TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS] (“[R]hetoric here refers to the art of 
persuasion through eloquent, inventive, and strategically organized discourse, 
both oral and written.”); Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal 
Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546 n.14 (1990) (“By ‘rhetoric,’ I mean the 
discipline . . . in which the objects of formal study are the conventions of 
discourse and argument.”). 
19
 “Classical rhetoric” was begun in the fifth century B.C.E. and continued on 
and perfected over the course of the next 1,000 years of Greco-Roman history 
by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.  See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, 
at 15–16, 18–19.  Even after this reign as the defining study of public discourse 
in classical times, the scholarship and teachings of classical rhetoric were 
followed as the dominant discipline for developing legal arguments until the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century. See id. at 2, 15.  The origin of classical 
rhetoric as a discipline devoted to the study of legal discourse and argumentation 
12  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
                                                                                                             
is traced to Corax of Syracuse. See, e.g., Michael Frost, Introduction to 
Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615 
(1999) [hereinafter Frost, Lost Heritage].  The early tenets of the discipline were 
critiqued by Socrates and by Socrates’ student, Plato, see infra note 19, and 
subsequently they were refined by Plato’s student, Aristotle. See JOHN H. 
MACKIN, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE vii, 6–7, 17–18, 26 
(1969).  The most important writings of classical rhetoric are those of Aristotle, 
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, Cicero, MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, 
DE INVENTIONE 93, 104 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, 
DE ORATORE (E.W. Sutton trans., 1942), and Quintilian, 1 MARIUS FABIUS 
QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 273 (H.E. Butler trans., 1954), which 
together define the canons of the discipline that serve as a rhetorical lens on 
legal discourse. 
20
 The contemporary period of rhetoric begins in the twentieth century.  Major 
movements in thought have broadened the study of rhetoric to include all 
aspects of communication, ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, 
supra note 16, at 61, including linguistics, ethics and persuasion, practical 
reasoning, human motivation, composition theories, cognitive studies, and 
socio-epistemic studies. Id. at 61–82.  See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS 
OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1968) (language as 
symbols); KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1969) [hereinafter 
BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES] (impact of culture); KENNETH BURKE, A 
RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1950) [hereinafter BURKE, RHETORIC OF MOTIVES] 
(impact of culture); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976) (language 
as symbols); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS 
OF MAN (1996) (modern media studies); C. K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE 
MEANING OF MEANING (1972) (language and meaning); I.A. RICHARDS, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC (1936) (language and meaning); RICHARD M. 
WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (1953) (ethics); Lloyd F. Bitzer, The 
Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 6–8, 389–92 (1968) [hereinafter 
Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation] (the impact of situation).  Over time, the 
cognitive rhetoric group divided into the process theory cognitivists, who 
believe that the study of rhetoric should focus on the process of writing, a 
recursive rather than linear creative process, that teaches the writer how to 
reason and persuade and improve their communication by examining each stage 
of the writing process, see ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, 
supra note 16, at 79, and the discourse community cognitivists, who believe the 
study of rhetoric is a study of the writer’s assimilation into and acceptance of the 
tenets, vocabulary, and expectations of a discourse community, such as the legal 
writing discourse community.  See, e.g., id.  The socio-epistemic group 
combines social theories of community with epistemological theories of learning 
to form a theory of communication that considers the interaction of speaker, 
subject matter, and audience.  See id. at 81.  
 The common thread among these the schools of thought in the developing 
discipline of contemporary rhetoric was a shift in thinking on the nature of 
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study of persuasion and argument has a noble and classical 
tradition, but the discipline has had difficulty shaking off a 
common but enduring slur that is traced to ancient sources: 
Socrates and Plato described the early study and practice of 
rhetoric by the ancient Greek Sophists as the art of flattery and 
trickery,21 and throughout the ages the slur has stuck.  I emphasize 
that this slur is not the subject of my study here.  Rhetoric, the 
academic discipline, is not the study of hollow speech, not puffery 
designed to prop up specious assertions, not hyperbole employed 
to distract an audience from the truths or falsities of the speakers’ 
                                                                                                             
knowledge and truth. Kristen K. Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal 
Education: Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing 
Faculty, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 123 (2006) [hereinafter 
ROBBINS, PHILOSOPHY V. RHETORIC].  Beginning in the 1950s, Stephen Toulmin 
and Chaim Perelman asserted that truth is relative. Id.  See, e.g., STEPHEN E. 
TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT (updated ed. 2003) [hereinafter TOULMIN, USES 
OF ARGUMENT]; CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (William 
Kluback trans., 1982) [hereinafter PERELMAN, REALM OF RHETORIC]; 
PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7.  Toulmin argued that people in 
everyday life do not use Aristotelian logic to establish conclusive proof, but 
"informal logic" to reason and to acquire knowledge. TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION 
TO REASONING, supra note 7, at 94–134.  The knowledge acquired and the 
arguments made are only probable, not absolute. Id.  Like Toulmin, Perelman 
argued that appeals to reason lead only to probable truths:  “the appeal to reason 
must be identified not as an appeal to a single truth but instead as an appeal for 
the adherence of an audience. . . .”  CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC: A 
THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING, GREAT IDEAS TODAY 234–52 (1970) (as 
reprinted in JAMES L. GOLDEN ET AL., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 
234–52 (6th ed. 1997)). From these beginnings, three contemporary theories of 
rhetoric arose to focus on the construction of meaning, the creation of 
arguments, and the processes that allow the creation of meaning and 
argumentation. See Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 118–21 (1993).  These are:  Modern Argument Theory, 
Writing as a Process Theory, and the Theory of Discourse Communities. See 
Michael Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139. 
21
 Socrates did not devote his time to the publication of works, so we rely on 
Plato whose writings purport to represent Socrates’ criticisms of rhetoric in such 
famous dialogues as PLATO, PHAEDRUS, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/ 
dialogues/7_phaedrus.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010), PLATO, GORGIAS, 
http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/15_gorgias.htm (last accessed 
Dec. 27, 2010), and PLATO, PHAEDO, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/ 
dialogues/14_phaedo.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010). 
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position.22  In short, it is nothing like the meaning of the 
commonplace phrase, “mere rhetoric.”23 I am not examining law 
and economics as a scheme of flattery and trickery but rather as a 
discipline with a well-developed system of argumentation and 
persuasion that has lessons for legal discourse beyond the realm of 
economic analysis of law. 
B. Excerpts from the History of the Rhetoric of Law and 
Economics 
The discipline of economics is rhetorical,24 and the discipline 
of law and economics is rhetorical, too.25  Adam Smith, the 
honorary father of economics, apparently understood the rhetorical 
imperatives of economics and the law when, in his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence concerning principle in the human mind and the 
division of labor, he commented on the topic of exchanges and 
self-interest:  
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so 
plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an 
                                                 
22
 See, e.g., KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE RHETORICAL ACT 3–4 (1982); 
Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, in Toward a New Rhetoric, 14 C. 
COMPOSITION & COMM. 139, 139 (1963) [hereinafter Booth, The Rhetorical 
Stance]; Wayne C. Booth, The Idea of a University as Seen by a Rhetorician, 
1987 Ryerson Lecture, University of Chicago, available at 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~ahkissel/booth/booth.htm (last accessed Nov. 23, 
2010) [hereinafter Booth, Idea of a University]. 
23
 See BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC, supra note 12, at vii, x, 6–7; 
Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, supra note 20, at 139; Eileen A. Scallen, 
Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, 
Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAC. L. REV. 813, 817, 829 (2003). 
24
 See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS xix–xx, 5 (2d 
ed. 1998) [MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS] [Note that the author, 
Donald N. McCloskey, became Deirdre N. McCloskey; the two names refer to 
the same author, but in my citations I will use the name or names used at the 
time of publication of the works cited herein]; see generally Arjo Klamer & 
Donald N. McCloskey, Economics in the Human Conversation, in ARJO 
KLAMER, DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 3–4, 11 (1988); DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & DEIRDRE 
N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS 38–52 (1994). 
25
 MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 760. 
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argument to persuade one to do so and so for it is in his 
interest. . . .  Men always endevour [sic] to persuade others 
to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no 
consequence to them. . . . And in this manner every one is 
practicing oratory on others thro [sic] the whole of his 
life.”26   
Robert L. Heilbroner interprets Smith to mean that “the basis for 
economic relationships lies not in a disinterested calculation of 
advantages, but in the ‘faculties of reason and speech’ that underlie 
the capacity for persuasion.”27 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who is quoted in Cooter and Ulen’s 
seminal text on law and economics,28 held that:  
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may 
be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the 
man of statistics and master of economics. . . . We learn 
that for everything we have to give up something else, and 
we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other 
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when 
we elect.29   
Judge Richard Posner summarizes the foundational rhetoric of 
law and economics as follows: 
[T]he most interesting aspect of the law and economics 
movement has been its aspiration to place the study of law 
on a scientific basis, with coherent theory, precise 
hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of 
the hypotheses.  Law is . . . amenable to scientific study.  
Economics is the most advanced of the social sciences, and 
                                                 
26
 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, as quoted in Robert L. Heilbroner, 
Rhetoric and Idealogy, in ARJO KLAMER, DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT 
M. SOLOW, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC at 38 (1988) 
[hereinafter Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy]. 
27
 Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38. 
28
 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2. 
29
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469, 
474 (1897), quoted in COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 1.  
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the legal system contains many parallels to and overlaps 
with the systems that economists have studied 
successfully.30 
 
[The economic] approach enables the law to be seen, 
grasped, and studied as a system—a system that economic 
analysis can illuminate, reveal as coherent, and in places 
improve.  By the same token, the approach enables 
economics to be seen as a tool for understanding and 
reforming social practices, rather than merely as a formal 
system of daunting mathematical complexity.31 
C. The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics 
Law and economics is a discipline whose persuasion is built 
from the application of scientific analyses—especially 
mathematics and the quantitative analysis of empirical data—to 
social problems.32  Law is a discipline that attempts to deal with 
social problems, and legal issues and the social conditions created 
or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the law are problems or 
conditions that may be subjected to economic analyses “with 
                                                 
30
 Richard A. Posner, Foreword, to MICHAEL FAURE & ROGER VAN DEN 
BERGH, ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 5 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, 
Foreword], quoted in COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 1. 
31
 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at xxi. 
32
 Heilbroner states: 
Economics prides itself on its sciencelike character, and economists on 
their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values, 
preferably in the language of mathematics. . . . [M]ost [economics] 
articles are “written” in matrix algebra, complex econometrics, formal 
lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics.  They would be 
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and 
techniques of advanced economics . . . [T]he language of formalism 
and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably 
“rhetorical.” 
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 25, at 38–39.  See also Herbert 
M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law:  Conflicting Norms in 
the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42–43, 59 (2009). 
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coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and 
empirical tests of the hypotheses.”33 
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of 
legal rules on behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or 
common sense concerning human behavior.34  The theories are 
behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will respond to 
laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.35  Legal 
economists assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on 
the law because it has mathematically precise theories (price 
theory and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics 
and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules and 
sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively 
rational) human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for 
individuals and for society.36 
II. THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. The Four Canons 
If law and economics is inherently rhetorical, then what is the 
rhetorical nature of this discipline when used as a rhetorical lens in 
the law?  I start with my summary of the rhetoric of the discipline 
introduced earlier: Economics combines mathematically precise 
theories and empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects of 
incentives and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to 
achieve efficient results for individuals and for society.37  From 
this, I derive the four canons of law and economics rhetoric: 
                                                 
33
 Posner, Foreword, supra note 28, at 5. 
34
 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4. 
35
 See id. at 4. 
36
 See id. at 3, 4, 5.  See also JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 
(4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Kritzer, supra 
note 30, at 42–43, 59. 
37
 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 5.  The rhetorician James Boyd 
White channeled the rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the 
legal system in the following way:  “The overriding metaphor is that of the 
machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as the 
attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.” James Boyd White, 
Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC 
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Mathematics and Science 
The primacy of mathematical and scientific methods of 
analysis and demonstration38 
Incentives and Costs 
The characterization of law and the legal system in the 
language of incentives and costs 39 
Efficiency 
The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency40 
Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice 
The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by 
modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain 
science41 
Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as 
topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in 
persuasive discourse.  The canons represent the fundamental 
assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and 
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and 
design and according to which theses concerning law and 
economics will be accepted as reliable and authoritative by the 
members of the law and economics discipline42—in other words, 
                                                                                                             
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al. eds., 1987) (quoted in Levine & 
Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 18, at 114). 
38
 Discussed in Part II.A.1, infra. 
39
 Discussed in Part II.A.2, infra. 
40
 Discussed in Part II.A.3, infra. 
41
 Discussed in Part II.A.4, infra. 
42
 The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and 
varied, but for general reference, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 2, 3, 4, 5, 
41–43; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 3–4, 9, 13, 21, 
24–25, 495–96; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics after 
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by the members of the law and economics discourse community.43  
Therefore, these canons are described as rhetorical canons of law 
and economics. 
B. The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and 
Economics 
Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a 
manner that reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive 
exercise; all of the canons work together and simultaneously to 
affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the discipline or 
activity.  Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of 
the other canons, making them more or less persuasive.  In 
classical rhetoric, the three canons of invention (aspects of 
persuasion that must be devised or “invented” by the author or 
speaker) known as logos, ethos, and pathos,44 are often depicted as 
a rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to 
another and the combined impact on the recipient of the discourse: 
  
                                                                                                             
Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007); and the sources cited in 
subsections 1–4 of this section. 
43
 “Discourse community” is a term that grounds this discussion as to the 
rhetoric of law and economics.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding 
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 419–38 (1995) 
(economic representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential 
Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 & n.53 (1989) (describing 
the discourse of law and economics). 
44
 See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 71–84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL 
RHETORIC, supra note 52, at 68, 75, 82, 89; Covino & Joliffe, supra note 15, at 
17, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Michael Frost, Greco-
Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 127 
(1992) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis]; Robin Smith, 
Aristotle's Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2004 
ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
sum2002/entries/aristotle-logic/ (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011) (last substantive edit 
Oct. 5, 2000). 
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James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder 
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reader or audience to reality.
with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos of the 
message so as to influence the pathos of the audience.
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.
Aristotle sought to remind advocates that an argument is not one
dimensional.  The most logically constructed argument still will 
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 WISSE, supra note 
46
 See JAMES L. 
DISCOURSE 19 (1971) [
L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader 
and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL 
1091. 
47
 WISSE, supra note 
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not persuade an audience if the audience questions the knowledge, 
skill, or credibility of the author.  Similarly, the most respected 
author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the 
day if her argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes 
apart at the seams with a single, gentle tug at one of its logical 
flaws.  An ironclad argument may be delivered in such a way as to 
antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be 
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and 
credibility of the author.49 
The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact 
together at the same time and toward the same audience.  Proper 
economic discourse incorporates each canon for the persuasion of 
the audience.  There is a connection and interaction in the 
discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion 
of the audience—one cannot alter or abandon the canons of 
efficiency, mathematical and scientific certainty, response to 
incentives, and even rational choice without affecting the 
persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse.  An 
incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon 
puts the others at risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience.  As 
with classical rhetorical modes of invention, the interaction of the 
canons of law and economics may be depicted visually, although 
with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle:  
  
                                                 
49
 See generally CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72–73; Frost, Ethos, 
Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note 45. 
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1. The Primacy of Mathematical and Scientific Methods of 
Analysis and Demonstration 
The practitioners of law and economics—those who follow the 
conventional and the contemporary approaches—rely on the 
inherent persuasiveness of mathematics and the methodologies of 
scientific proof both as a method of analysis and as a form for the 
demonstration50 of the analysis.51  Members of the economic 
disciplines hold themselves out as scientists, applying logical, 
scientific deduction and induction to prove propositions.52  The 
syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms) and the induction and 
example (inductive forms) are topoi of invention and arrangement 
                                                 
50
 Demonstration and dialectic are the two principle forms of reasoning 
recognized by Aristotle.  See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Book 
I, ch. 1 at 1354a; GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS 
CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 80 
(1999) [hereinafter KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC].  See also P. CHRISTOPHER 
SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: DEMONSTRATION, 
DIALECTIC, RHETORIC (1998).  Rhetoric is the form of demonstration used in 
argumentative persuasion or “continuous discourse,” whereas dialectic is more 
appropriate to debate.  KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra at 66.  
Demonstration provides the rhetorical process of arrangement with two 
paradigms of deductive reasoning, sullogismos (syllogisms) and enthumema 
(enthymemes), CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 38–60; KENNEDY, 
CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra, at 83–84; Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric, in 
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2002 ed.), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/ 
aristotle-rhetoric/ (accessed Feb. 7, 2008) (last substantive edit May 2, 2002), 
and two paradigms of inductive reasoning, the induction and the example.  See 
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b; Brett G. 
Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 752 
& n.58 (2004); Robert H. Schmidt, The Influence of the Legal Paradigm on the 
Development of Logic, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 367, 372–73 (1999). 
51
 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4; Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric 
and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38–39; Kritzer, supra note 30, at 42–43, 59. 
52
 GEORGE PÓLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I 
OF MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING v–vi (1954); McCloskey, 
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 752, 760.  The pros and cons 
of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is growing 
in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009–10.  E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith 
versus Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445, 451–52, 455–56 (2010). 
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in science, mathematics, and rhetorical demonstration.53 
Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the 
rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical methods of 
analysis in forming hypotheses, designing the methods for testing 
the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics, and information 
collected to test the hypotheses.54  Law and economics also 
assumes the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical 
forms in discourse to demonstrate the analyses and communicate 
its theses about human behavior.55   
In contemporary law and economics, predictions and 
prescriptions are informed by scientific testing and mathematical 
analysis of data not just by logic, intuition, common sense, 
ideology, or philosophy.56  The methods of examination and the 
assumptions made that are supported by the rhetoric of 
                                                 
53
 The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the 
syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal 
argument is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at 
Bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a.  The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme 
provides the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal 
discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT.  LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL 
WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 
2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive discourse); 
MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7 (2009) (discussing IRAC and TREAT); James M. 
Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: Legal Writing Professors 
Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719–23 (2006) 
(discussing IRAC and IREAC); Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: 
Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 
483, 484–87, 492 (2003) [hereinafter Robbins, Paradigm Lost] (discussing 
IRAC and IREAC). 
54
 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 15–16; Posner, 
Foreword, supra note 28, at 5; Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal 
of Legal Studies—An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972) [hereinafter 
Posner, Afterword].  See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and 
Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services 
at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 (1998); Gary Minda, supra 
note 51, at 611–12. 
55
 See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 57, 59 (1990)); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or 
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980). 
56
 E.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 5. 
 Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 25 
contemporary law and economics and law and behavioral science 
are those that are susceptible to scientific proof through the 
application of mathematical and scientific methods of analysis of 
empirical data to confirm or rebut hypotheses and assumptions 
about human behavior in the context of the law.57  But the 
propositions chosen to be proved, and especially the design of the 
experiments or studies that will be adequate and reliable to prove 
the propositions, rely on rhetoric—the rhetoric being that which is 
held within the disciplines to be reasonable, reliable, and provable 
using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology.58   
Mathematics is a language, and like any other language, is 
rhetorical.59  Mathematics is a wonderful tool of analysis, but the 
elevation of mathematical forms and models as the primary 
method of demonstration in economic rhetoric comes with a 
warning for the application of this trope in general legal discourse:  
it is not realistic to assume that every legal issue and social 
                                                 
57
 See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW ET AL., ANALYTICAL 
METHODS FOR LAWYERS 372, 375–77 (2003). 
58
 Compare Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally 
Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of 
Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439 (1992); and Anthony T. Kronman, 
Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 678–79, 682 (1999), and John M. Rogers & 
Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons about the Law from Self-Referential Problems 
in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992), with David R. Dow, Godel and 
Langdell - A Reply to Brown and Greenberg's Use of Mathematics in Legal 
Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1993), and Kevin W. Saunders, Realism, 
Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 219 (1993); and Mike Townsend, 
Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in 
Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 54, 61–63, 121–124 
(1996) [hereinafter Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises]. 
59
 See David N. Haynes, The Language and Logic of Law: A Case Study, 35 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 186–87, 220 (1981); Donald N. McCloskey, The 
Lawyerly Rhetoric of Coase's The Nature Of The Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 425, 425–
26, 428–31 (1993); Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises, supra note 
60, at 62–63, 141; Mike Townsend & Thomas Richardson, Probability and 
Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A Case Study in Disciplinary Aspects of 
Interdisciplinarity, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 447, 483–84 (2002); Joan C. Williams, 
Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New 
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 439 (1987). 
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condition can be subjected to mathematical analysis.60  Albert 
Einstein once said, “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to 
reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do 
not refer to reality.”61  
The very word, proof, as in what the economist or behavioral 
scientist has proved, is inherently rhetorical in nature,62 and it is a 
powerfully persuasive word.  An assertion that something is 
proved or even can be proved is a rhetorical assertion because, 
even in mathematics, there are some assertions and propositions 
that cannot be proved within a known mathematical system.63  The 
differences in opinions as to what are reasonable, reliable, and 
provable assumptions and predictions in economics using a 
scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology have led to 
internal divisions within the law and economics community, and 
led directly to the creation of the law and behavioral science 
discipline, as discussed in Part II.A.4 below.   
The rhetorical use of mathematical forms in law and 
economics—the use of mathematics as a trope of arrangement and 
style in the demonstration—is to this author the most intriguing 
aspect of this canon, and the most delicate topic from which to 
draw prescriptions for legal discourse.  The appearance of 
mathematical certainty in law and economics rhetoric is an 
                                                 
60
 See generally Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law 
and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 
1383–84 (2010); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A 
Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 881, 889–90 (1989); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1331–32 (1971). 
61
 Albert Einstein, quoted in F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 27 (1975). 
62
 McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 752, 760. 
63
 See Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation 
of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 597 (1989); Steven P. Goldberg, On Legal and 
Mathematical Reasoning, 22 JURIMETRICS 83, 87 n.26 (1981); Susan K. Houser, 
Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1152 
(1993); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 136 n.3 
(1992); Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for 
Authentication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 956, 999 n.214 (1986); Roy Stone, Affinities and Antinomies in 
Jurisprudence, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 281. 
 Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 27 
attractive tool, but is it too seductive? Critics have challenged legal 
economists for adopting complex mathematical formulae to 
demonstrate findings the relevance of which to actual legal 
problems and social conditions is said to be specious.64  
Nevertheless, the a priori, ex ante, positivist application of 
mathematical formulas to legal topics and problems has led the 
practitioners of neoclassical law and economics to claim their 
greatest successes.65  Unfortunately, this has come at a cost, 
namely a string of mathematically verifiable prescriptions that 
brought about policies that contributed to the severity of the Great 
Recession. 
I explained above that my purpose here is not to critique the 
benefits or costs of the use of the canons of law and economics in 
the economic analysis of law.  My purpose is to explore the 
application of these rhetorical canons in legal discourse generally.  
On the one hand, mathematics is a language, and thus rhetorical, 
and its particular form of persuasion is an appeal to certainty by the 
open demonstration of the truth and logic of its workings.66  On the 
other hand, mathematical forms of demonstration may be 
employed to attempt to overcome “the difference between truth in 
mathematics and truth in law—between logical truths and 
                                                 
64
 E.g., MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 22, at 44–45; 
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38; Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A 
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 485–90 (1987). 
65
 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at xix (championing 
the unity, simplicity, and power, but also the subtlety, of economic principles); 
James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and 
the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275, 
287–88 (1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal 
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 5 (1994) ("Assumptions about preference have 
enabled neoclassical economics and public choice theory to describe both 
private and public markets by means of mathematical models that have great 
elegance and rhetorical power."); Richard Posner, The Sociology of the 
Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 265, 274 
(1995). 
66
 See MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 
761, 763; Kronman, supra note 60, at 679; Schmidt, supra note 52, at 395–96. 
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rhetorical or dialectical or polemical truths”67—by cloaking the 
legal discourse in the rhetorical garb of mathematics68 and 
science,69 making the findings appear to be more certain and 
                                                 
67
 See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and 
Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983) (citing two of the most 
influential modern rhetoricians, Kenneth Burke, Politics as Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS 
45, 46–47 (1982); and CHAIM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: 
ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 120–74 (1980); CHAIM PERELMAN, 
THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES 1–61, 117–33 (1979)).  The 
difference between formal logic and the absolute proof of the syllogism, and 
informal logic used in everyday discourse to assert the most probable arguments 
in everyday situations, is one of the primary impetuses that motivated the move 
to contemporary schools of rhetoric building on the work of Burke and 
Perelman.  See also BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; BURKE, A 
RHETORIC OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; PERELMAN, REALM OF RHETORIC, supra 
note 18; PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 18.  
Pigou, one of the forefathers of neoclassical law and economics, pointed out the 
distinction between formal logic and pure mathematics on the one side and the 
"realistic sciences" on the other, as to which economics was to be a realistic 
science.  A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 5 (4th ed. 1962) (“On the 
one side are the sciences of formal logic and pure mathematics, whose function 
it is to discover implications. On the other side are the realistic sciences, such as 
physics, chemistry and biology, which are concerned with actualities.”). 
68
 E.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN 
LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007); 
McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 753–54; Joseph 
Vining, The Gift of Language, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (1998).  
See also Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazan Prelec, Coherent 
Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q. J. 
ECON. 73–106 (2003) (demonstrating how the illusion of stable, ordered 
preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors); Gary Becker, Irrational 
Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4 (1962). 
69
 MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 22, at 147; Morton 
J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 
912 (1980); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About 
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 478–81 (1974).  The excessively persuasive 
effect of scientific demonstration is a problem in non-economic legal settings, 
too, such as evidence law.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 7.8, at 992 
(1995) (“Scientific proof may suggest unwarranted certainty to lay factfinders, 
especially if it comes dressed up in technical jargon, complicated mathematical 
or statistical analysis, or involves a magic machine (‘black box’) that may seem 
to promise more than it delivers”); John William Strong, Language and Logic in 
Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, 
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absolute than they really are.  It seems highly likely that 
government policy was shifted because of the seeming certainly of 
the formulas that supported law and economics’ prescriptions 
regarding unregulated markets and government non-interference in 
financial systems.  This possibility sends a significant message of 
caution for the ethos-minded use of mathematical and scientific 
forms in general legal discourse. 
2. The Characterization of Law and the Legal System in the 
Language of Incentives and Costs 
The rhetoric of traditional and contemporary law and 
economics begins with a seminal insight of economics:  that people 
respond to incentives70 and that the law (legal rules and the legal 
system) can create incentives that can influence human behavior in 
one direction and can create disincentives that can influence 
human behavior in the other direction.71  Legal rules and the legal 
system can “encourage socially desirable conduct and discourage 
undesirable conduct” by rewarding or subsidizing certain behavior 
and punishing or taxing other behavior.72  Legal rules and the legal 
                                                                                                             
Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 n.81 (1992) (“There is virtual 
unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to 
be ‘scientific’ in nature will have particularly persuasive effect.”). See also 
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific 
evidence “assume[s] a posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of 
laymen”); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(describing scientific testimony's “aura of special reliability and 
trustworthiness”).  But see Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions 
Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror 
“Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083 (1993) 
(jurors are able to evaluate competing scientific and technical testimony). 
70
 Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054; 
Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created 
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 987 (2009). 
71
 See Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 
1127, 1132 (1991); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and 
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 412–14 (2005); Korobkin & 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1043. 
72
 Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054.  See 
Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal 
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 164–65 (1996); Lior 
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system can increase the costs of certain behavior or lesson the 
costs of other behavior.73 
The premise that people respond to incentives is rhetorical;74 it 
is both an assumption and a presumption that shapes the 
predictions that analysts using the methodology of law and 
economics can make about the effects of law and the 
recommendations that these analysts are willing to make about 
changes to the law.75 Law and economics imported this assumption 
from economics, along with the assumption that people react 
rationally to incentives.76  
Economists’ examination of human behavior within various 
legal and social environments of the world involves the 
characterization of many phenomena as either incentives or costs.77  
                                                                                                             
Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711 (2008); Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence 
Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
343, 343–47 (1989). 
73
 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 84; Steven Garber, 
Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic 
Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 284–86 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054; Peter Reuter, A Just Use of 
Economics or Just Use Economics, 70 CAL. L. REV. 850, 853–54 (1982). 
74
 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright 
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (discussing the rhetoric of incentives 
in copyright law); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996) (same). 
75
 See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054; 
Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in 
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1795–96 & nn.42–44 
(2003) (discussing “overadvocacy” of legal incentives). 
76
 Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 781, 795 (2005); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054; George Stigler, Economists and 
Public Policy, 1982 REGULATION 13–16 (May–June 1982). 
77
 See Balganesh, supra note 77, at 1591–92; Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. 
Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the 
United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1589–92 (2008); Owen D. Jones, Time-
Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics 
Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1141–42, 1198–99 (2001); 
Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1058. 
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The canon of incentives and costs states that humans and human 
institutions facing a choice in conditions of scarce resources (thus 
requiring a choice) will act in ways that achieve or realize 
(maximize) the incentives and avoid (minimize) the costs.78  When 
the actor under examination is government, the rhetoric of the 
discipline defines the benefits and rewards offered or imposed by 
government as incentives and the costs imposed or perpetuated by 
government as taxes or externalities.79  When the actors under 
examination are private parties, the rhetoric of the discipline 
defines incentives and costs in economic terms such as offers, 
inducements, price, or rent.80  The presumption is that humans are 
motivated to alter their behavior in response to incentives and 
costs.81 
The language of economics—cost, benefit, incentives, 
disincentives, externalities, and economics—already is widely 
embraced in the law.  Courts and scholars alike have widely 
embraced the language of incentives and costs in their discussions 
of law and legal analysis as part of the general acceptance of 
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 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 4; Philip B. 
Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 797, 829–30, 848–49 (1973); Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, 
Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of 
Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 448–49 (2004). 
79
 See generally W. KELLER, TAX INCIDENCE: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
APPROACH (1980); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 22; 
Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1717, 1740 (1982); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of 
Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447, 1463–64 (1991). 
80
 Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing 
Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167–68 (1993); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the 
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 
471, 492–94 (1988); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the 
Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a 
“Sociological” Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327, 
329–30 & n.3 (1993); Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 600–01 (2005). 
81
 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 4; Korobkin, supra 
note 79, at 781, 795; George Stigler, supra note 79, at 13–16. 
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economic considerations in legal analysis, as suggested by the 
following chart: 
Database82 
Cases or 
Articles 
using the 
term 
“cost” 
with 
“benefit”
83
 
Cases or 
Articles 
using the 
term 
“incentive
” with 
“law” 
“legal” or 
“govern-
ment”84 
Cases or 
Articles 
using the 
term “dis-
incentive” 
with “law” 
“legal” or 
“govern-
ment”85 
Cases or 
Articles 
using the 
term 
“externality(
ies)”86  
Cases or 
Articles 
using the 
term 
“economic
(s)” with 
“law” or 
“analysis”
87
 
ALLFEDS 5225 2093 186 170 4303 
ALLSTATES 3423 924 88 86 1935 
JLR 10,000+88 10,000+ 1447 10,000+ 10,000+ 
BRIEFS 1465 536 58 43 1014 
 
This chart (a taxonomy, an economic-friendly demonstration of 
data—a topos of arrangement or trope of style) indicates that the 
language (i.e., the rhetoric) of costs and incentives is fairly 
common in legal analysis among courts and in legal scholarship.  
Legal authors—judges, scholars, and practitioners—already are 
employing incentives and costs language in substantive legal 
discourse with significant frequency.  Every time an author writes 
about a cost-benefit analysis, every time a change in the law is said 
to “incentivize” certain conduct, every time a license or permit 
application process is said to provide a disincentive to an activity, 
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 Westlaw database for all federal cases since 1945, all state cases since 1945, 
all journals and law review articles, and appellate briefs filed in ten state courts 
of appeals (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, 
North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin) with coverage of appellate briefs 
ranging by state; the earliest coverage is 1991–present (Washington) and the 
latest is 2006–present (Arizona). 
83
 Westlaw search terms used:  cost /2 benefit. 
84
 Westlaw search terms used:  incentive /5 law legal government. 
85
 Westlaw search terms used:  disincentive /5 law legal government. 
86
 Westlaw search terms used:  externalit! 
87
 Westlaw search terms used:  economic /2 law analysis 
88
 Entries marked 10,000+ indicate search results exceeding 10,000 
documents (articles). 
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every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an 
“externality” on the cost of litigation, the author uses a rhetorical 
trope of style (a figure of speech) to discuss laws and legal 
conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not necessarily 
business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of 
pecuniary sums or damages.89 
The basic statement that humans respond favorably to 
incentives and not favorably to costs disguises the rhetorical 
complexity of this presumption when it comes to making 
predictions about human behavior in legal situations and in 
response to legal conditions.  First, incentives or costs must be 
designed, communicated, and recognized by the human actor or 
institution; government must correctly design and communicate its 
actions so as to offer the benefit or impose the tax that government 
intends to offer to or impose on its audience of citizens, and private 
actors must correctly design and communicate their actions so as to 
offer the correct intended inducement or impose the intended price 
or rent.90  Second, and equally important to the rhetoric of the 
discipline, is the fact that the action must be perceived and 
understood by the human audience, the object or recipient of 
government’s or a private actor’s action, and what should be 
perceived and understood as an incentive as opposed to a cost is 
not always a simple process for humans.91 
The rhetorical canon of incentives and cost is closely 
associated with the canon of rational choice: the design, 
communication, perception, and motivation concerning incentives 
and costs require analysis and an understanding of the rhetorical 
audience and the rhetorical situation.92 Scientific empirical analysis 
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 See, e.g., THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 
(1990); Levine & Saunders, supra note 18, at 118–21; Fred A. Simpson & 
Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifts—Aristotle and the 
Rules of Evidence, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2003). 
90
 See infra Part II.A.4. 
91
 See infra Part II.A.4. 
92
 When is a situation “rhetorical”?—When the audience of the message in the 
situation has the opportunity to alter reality.  When the audience has no choice, 
the situation is not rhetorical.  A situation is made up of:  subject—place—
34  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
of human behavior indicates that there are limitations on humans’ 
abilities to understand and appreciate benefits and costs.93 These 
limitations are assumed and represented in the rhetorical statement 
that humans are creatures of “bounded” abilities—bounded 
rationality, bounded ability to gather information, bounded 
perception, and bounded cognition.  These bounds limit humans’ 
abilities to perceive and understand the incentives and costs set 
before them, which in turn complicates the predictions and 
prescriptions of economists regarding the motivational effect of 
incentives and costs.  This is the rhetorical “audience” 
consideration with incentives and costs.   
Separately, there is the mounting scientific empirical evidence 
of the social, cognitive, and brain sciences that indicates that 
humans are situational decision-makers.94  A consideration of the 
rhetorical problems of audience and situation are commonplace in 
rhetoric, and contemporary rhetoric in particular has covered this 
ground well.95 
                                                                                                             
time—audience—speaker.  See Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, 
at 6–8, 389–92; Greenhaw, supra note 8, at 875–80. 
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 E.g., John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
669 (1996); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640 
(1999); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 1471; Symposium: The Legal 
Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the 
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 
(1990); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 
1502 (1998) [hereinafter Langevoort, Behavioral Theories]; Herbert A. Simon, 
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955). 
94
 See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 96, at 640; Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situation, supra note 5; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, 
supra note 1. 
95
 E.g., White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 13, at 695: 
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something 
rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and 
among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others 
in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to 
somebody, and speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes 
place with given materials. 
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3. The Rhetorical Economic Concept of Efficiency 
There are two kinds of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and 
economics:  (1) formal efficiency as a preference for simple, 
elegant formulae and solutions, and (2) the substantive economic 
concepts of efficiency as a standard and goal of law and policy.  
Both modes employ a highly rhetorical turn.  The adoption and 
application of the rhetorical primacy of science and mathematics 
carries other implications for the discipline, including, for 
example, that a more efficient (elegant) solution to a problem is 
preferred under the rhetoric of mathematics and science and 
subsequently under the rhetoric of economics and the rhetoric of 
law and economics.96  The formal desire for efficiency in structure 
and form leads to a high priority for elegance and simplicity in the 
equations and formulae of the discipline.97  Naturally, elegant and 
effective formulae that are substantively correct make an important 
impact regarding the understanding of economists, but I describe 
this mode as offering a different layer of persuasion for non-
economists because non-economists can appreciate the 
persuasiveness of an elegant formula and simple solution because 
this mode of presentation promotes clarity and openness, revealing 
the workings and falsifiability of the reasoning. 
                                                                                                             
Id.; Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92; Greenhaw, 
supra note 8, at 875–80. 
 The contemporary analysis of communication produces a formula for the 
speaker’s invention of discourse crafted for a given situation:  Exigence (a/k/a 
the rhetorical problem, the reason for speaking, and the urgency thereof) + 
Audience (mediators of change—those who may be moved from one point to 
another in the situation) + Constraints (the physical or psychological limitations 
or opportunities of the situation) = Fitting response (the speaker’s purpose and 
objectives).  See Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 390–92; 
Greenhaw, supra note 8, at 875–80.  This model easily can be applied to 
economic analysis—if the object of the incentive has no choice, then there is no 
opportunity for theorizing rational choice of incentives in that situation. 
96
 “Mathematical elegance often becomes the primary goal, with usefulness in 
the realm of law, that combines logic with human experience, a mere 
afterthought.”  Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 
1054.   
97
 See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 16; 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 4, 5 (1994). 
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In substantive terms, law and economics assumes and 
advocates efficiency over more abstract concepts of fairness, 
morality, and justice.98  This is not to say that fairness, morality, 
and justice are never incorporated into an economic analysis, but 
that economists find it preferable to assume such concepts into the 
rhetorical economic concepts of efficiency—in other words, 
assuming for purposes of a model or prescription that a fair, moral, 
and just solution will be more efficient according to one of the 
economic conceptions of efficiency.99  Efficiency (or parsimony) 
in the rhetoric of law and economics is not just a formal imperative 
for methods and procedures of modeling paradigms and the 
formulation of hypotheses and theses, but it also has been 
advanced as a substantive and instrumental imperative in positive 
examination of conditions, normative analysis of possible 
conditions, and prescriptions for future conditions.100  Efficiency, 
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 E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What 
Can Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 329–
30 (1998). 
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Robert D. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to 
the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. 
REV. 1260, 1263 (1982) (“A process is efficient when it yields the maximum 
output from given input, or equivalently, when it yields a given output with the 
minimum input.”); Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses 
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 309 (1979) [hereinafter 
Michelman, Comment]; Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the 
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1032–35 (1978) [hereinafter 
Michelman, Norms]; Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: 
 Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 37 
therefore, has become a rhetorical imperative in and of itself in law 
and economics.101 
The elevation of efficiency over other concepts associated with 
the law, such as fairness, morality, and justice, makes the work of 
law and economics simpler and easier in many ways,102 but more 
difficult in other ways.103  The substantive meaning of efficiency in 
the rhetoric of law and economics is a clever twist on a common 
word to add a very specific, and nonintuitive meaning for 
efficiency in law and economics—and not just one meaning.  In 
the rhetoric of economics, substantive and instrumental 
“efficiency” is defined in three, carefully crafted ways:  productive 
efficiency (sometime referred to by the undistinguishing term of 
economic efficiency), in which a process or action produces the 
intended result with maximum utility and minimum costs;104 
                                                                                                             
Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 345–46 
(1984). 
101
 “Although efficiency need not be the sole or primary goal of legal policy, 
economic analysis of law teaches that policymakers ignore the efficiency 
implications of their actions at society's peril. Legal rights that are 
unobjectionable in the abstract are not free but rather must be measured against 
their opportunity costs.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra 
note 4, at 1054 (inner citations omitted). 
102
 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 3–4, 
9–10 (2d ed. 1989) [POLINSKY, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Richard A. Posner, 
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 301 
(1979); Cass R. Sunstein, On Philosophy and Economics, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 333, 335–36, 348 (2000). 
103
 E.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 1508–09: 
laws may be efficient solutions to the problems of organizing society 
. . . [but] [t]he notion that laws emerge from considerations of 
efficiency and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most 
citizens as odd. . . . many laws on the books appear to be difficult to 
justify on efficiency grounds (for example, those that prohibit mutually 
beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities) and seem to benefit 
groups that do not have much lobbying power (such as the poor or 
middle class). 
Id. 
104
 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025, 1028–29 
(1987); R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and 
Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 
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Pareto efficiency105 (allocative efficiency), in which the situation 
cannot be altered to benefit one of the parties in the situation 
without making the other party worse off—better or worse off 
referring to the individual, subjective perceptions and preferences 
of the parties;106 and potential Pareto improvements or Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, in which incremental gains in benefits or 
incentives created by a change in action exceed incremental losses 
or costs imposed by the change in action.107 
The language of efficiency is intended to facilitate full and 
complete communication to members of the economics discourse 
community and facilitate a persuasive level of communication to 
communicate and advocate the findings of the discipline to the 
outside world.  Within the discipline, the rhetoric of law and 
economics assumes that it is easier to conceive of models of 
efficiency and form hypotheses of efficiency and to test these 
models and hypotheses of efficiency through scientific and 
mathematical methods of analysis than it would be to test fairness, 
morality, and justice using scientific and mathematical analyses.  
The models and forms that are developed give the appearance of 
rigorous scientific analysis that “proves” the hypotheses that a 
certain course or change in law produces efficient results, 
                                                                                                             
679, 690–91 (2000).  See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 17; WALTER 
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 
611–20 (9th ed. 2004). 
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 See VILFREDO PARETO, 4 THE MIND AND SOCIETY: THE GENERAL FORM OF 
SOCIETY 1459, 1465–69 (1907) (Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans., 1935) (1907); 
VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1906) (Ann. S. Schwier 
trans., 1971); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 12. 
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 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 17; POLINSKY, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, supra note 105, at 7 n.4; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 
supra note 1,  at 13, 14, 26; Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and 
Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. 
REV. 221 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical & Political Bases of the 
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 
(1980); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980).  See also ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 103–10, 433–35 (8th ed. 1920); ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 31–43 (1952); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 160–71 (3d ed. 1992). 
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 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 18. 
 Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 39 
whichever of the three forms of “efficient” results are assumed in 
the models and hypotheses.  
The success or failure of models and hypotheses concerning 
one or more of the economic definitions of efficiency is easier to 
observe through scientific and mathematical methods of analysis of 
statistics and econometric data than it would be to test a model or 
hypothesis of fairness, morality, or justice.  Success or failure is a 
highly desirable observation of any practical study, and models and 
hypotheses of fairness, morality, and justice may suffer from the 
fact that they may be tautological and non-falsifiable within the 
rhetorical definitions of fairness, morality, and justice in the law, 
philosophy, or ethics.  However, rational humans embrace 
concepts of fairness, morality, and justice, and act on them, which 
complicates economics predictions and prescriptions as to the 
effect of law and legal conditions.  The result of prescriptions 
concerning unregulated, unconstrained, but “efficient” financial 
markets is revealed in stark detail in the Great Recession.  
4. The Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice 
Law and economics presumes that human actors in legal 
situations are rational and will act in rational ways in response to 
legal conditions.  The early adopters of the law and economics 
analysis of law accepted a rhetorical assumption that when faced 
with choices, humans will respond rationally in making their 
choices, rather than acting randomly and capriciously; most 
importantly for the discipline of law and economics, it is assumed 
that humans will act predictably.108 The rhetoric of this position is 
known generally as rational choice theory.109 
Over the last five decades, rational choice theory employed by 
law and economics analysts has produced marked success in 
explaining and predicting human behavior when humans are 
confronted by incentives, costs, or opportunities, and many of 
these successes have been applied to make accurate predictions of 
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 See KOROBKIN & ULEN, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 
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the effect of existing laws or changes in the law on the behavior of 
humans subject to the laws.110 The successes produced under the 
rational choice theory lead some to argue that rational choice 
theory, defined broadly enough, and shaped to encompass all areas 
where predictions are reliable and verifiable and to exclude the 
areas and phenomena where predictions are unreliable and 
refutable, is all that an economic approach to the law requires.111  
In fact, some argue that the “correction” applied to economics by 
behavioral science—to reject many if not most of the assumptions 
represented by the rational choice theory—means that a behavioral 
approach to law and economics does not fit within the rhetoric of 
economics or law and economics at all.112 They argue that analysts 
of behavioral science may be applying psychology, or 
sociocultural, or cognitive theories to the law, but they are not 
applying economics.113  This is indeed a crisis within the rhetoric 
of the discipline. 
The definition of what it means to be “rational” in response to 
legal conditions and the weight given to the presumption of 
rationality differs depending on the legal situation that is being 
studied and the legal economist that is studying the situation.  
Cognitive science has indicated that situations affect decision 
making in ways that are contrary to traditional rational choice 
theory of maximizing self interest.114  A large part of the correction 
in the rhetoric of traditional law and economics advanced by the 
proponents of a behavioral approach to law and economics is a 
correction in the definition of rationality and the weight given to 
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the presumption of rationality in the face of various legal 
conditions.115  The behavioral approach asserts that the definition 
of rationality and its weight in making predictions about human 
behavior in the face of legal conditions must be modified with the 
knowledge and understanding gained from behavioral science, 
which gives a clearer picture of the nature and limits of human 
rationality in response to legal situations. 
The acceptance or at least the acknowledgement that rational 
choice is more bounded than traditional rational choice theories 
and models have predicted presents a problem for the rhetoric of 
the discipline and complexity in the use of rational choice theory 
as a rhetorical lens for legal discourse.  The rhetoric of the 
discipline can redefine its theories and definitions of “rational” so 
as to incorporate the empirical observations of seemingly non-
traditional, irrational behavior in legal situations requiring a 
choice.116  For example, in response to the ultimatum game 
studies,117 “rational” as a definition may be modified from a strict 
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self-interest, while allowing the offeree to take away something, however small.  
The studies belied this prediction by observing that offerees routinely rejected 
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position that one will act to maximize selfish pecuniary interests to 
a broader definition that one will act to maximize his or her own 
interests of whatever kind, one interest being the motivation to be 
and to be perceived as being fair in bargaining.   
Whether the rational choice theory is definitional (e.g., humans 
rationally make choices to maximize their ends),118 or based on a 
conception that humans make choices to maximize their expected 
utility from the choices made,119 or based on an assumption of 
human self-interest,120 or humans’ motivation toward wealth 
                                                                                                             
small offers, for example less than 20% of the sum, and offerors tended to offer 
much larger sums, frequently in the range of 40–50% of the sum assigned.  
Theories arising from these empirical data revolve around the concept of 
fairness and the parties’ perception of what is fair in the situation—that offerees 
will not accept an offer that is perceived to be unfair even though any offer, no 
matter how small, increased their pecuniary well being, and offerors offered a 
greater portion with an apparent motivation of trying to be fair or at least to be 
perceived as being fair.  This prompts researchers to include fairness and the 
perception of fairness as factors in conceptions of rational self-interest.  See, 
e.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating 
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 33–39 (1999); Kent Greenfield & 
Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and Profit-
Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate 
Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003); Peter H. Huang, Reasons 
Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 
OR. L. REV. 435, 474–75 (2000); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal 
Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1818–19 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly 
Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433, 459. 
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(1994); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
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maximization,121 the consequences for legal discourse points to the 
same goal:  that law should be communicated to people in a 
manner that maximizes the incentives to the reader to accept and 
be persuaded by the legal communication, and minimizes the costs 
imposed by the communication.   
CONCLUSION 
The rhetorical canons of law and economics did not cause the 
Great Recession.  Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal discourse, 
not universal goals and not perfect solutions.  Law and economics 
provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author might 
examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse.  But a 
lens, like any other tool, is only as good as its user.  My 
examination and critique of the canons seeks to reveal the 
interconnected relationships of the canons so as to trace the 
canons, and the assumptions and theories that they represent, in 
ongoing legal economic discourse. 
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and improved 
upon the basic perceptions of human behavior and knowledge of 
human nature of the ancient rhetoricians, but the more complex 
models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric have not replaced 
the classical rhetorical concept of ethos.  Contemporary rhetoric 
has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain science that 
confirm the importance of the classical rhetorical concept of pathos 
and the necessity that rhetoric examine the values of the audience 
in the rhetorical situation so as to anticipate the emotional reaction 
of the audience to the discourse.   Similar lessons are being learned 
in contemporary law and economics as brain science and cognitive 
studies add to our “understanding of understanding” and motivate 
our study of motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks 
to improve the designing of incentives in the face of new 
conceptions of rational choice.  Each discipline can learn lessons 
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from the other about the motivation and persuasion of different 
audiences in different situations. 
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from the new school of 
contemporary rhetoric, law and economics.  Efficiency, when used 
in appropriate ways in appropriate rhetorical situations, can 
improve discourse in style, arrangement, and invention.  The 
expression of legal conditions and legal effects in the language of 
incentives and costs inspires imagination that allows better 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of laws and 
legal policy; its widespread acceptance in the law is only further 
evidence of the rhetorical power of the language across many areas 
of the law and many legal situations.  The persuasiveness of 
mathematics and science extends to their forms and the substance 
of their proofs, and the use of the methods and forms may create 
meaning and inspire imagination that improves comprehension and 
understanding.  The forms of mathematics and science can 
promote clarity and open demonstration, permitting examination of 
the workings of the discourse and promoting the opportunity for 
falsification and rebuttal.    
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but not 
universally persuasive.  A topic of invention is a single place to 
find a method of argumentation, not the only place.  Many 
audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific forms, 
especially if they are used to attempt to avoid a primary question of 
fairness or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form 
(elegance, openness, and clarity) and in the elimination of costs 
and waste may be widely persuasive, but other economic rhetorical 
turns on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) are best 
left to the discourse of economists.  Incentives and costs is a 
language, and many rhetorical situations accept this language, but 
the general application must fit the topic and the situation; simply 
identifying something as an incentive or a cost will not be 
persuasive if the audience or the situation demands a different 
topos for argument or a more apt trope of style.   
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of law 
and economics.  Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms of 
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contemporary economics start with the assertion that mathematical 
and scientific methods of daunting complexity are used to hide the 
workings of the reasoning, not to promote understanding or 
persuasion.  The method is not rhetoric but a resort to the cudgel, 
used to overpower the audience with coercion not persuasion.  The 
formula might hide the workings of the reasoning rather than 
openly demonstrate the reasoning for falsification or rebuttal, all 
under an implied challenge and a dare to rebut the force of such a 
powerful device.  Charts and diagrammatics may be used to 
distract the audience or trick them into believing a mathematical or 
scientific analysis was performed to produce the assertions made in 
the rhetoric, when little or no math or science was involved.  
Quantitative analysis may crunch data the true meaning of which is 
buried in the assumptions made that chose what data to collect and 
what to exclude, and in the premises drawn from the assumptions 
that determined the possible conclusions that could be drawn from 
the experiment or analysis.   
Law and economics relies on mathematics and science, 
efficiency, incentives and costs, and rational choice theory for full 
and complete communication with legal economists, but often uses 
the same topics and tropes as powerful props in communication 
with lawmakers and policy-makers—again, rightly or wrongly 
according to the ethos of the speaker and the communication.122  
The canons of law and economics rhetoric, like the canons of the 
other schools of contemporary rhetoric, may be employed to 
promote effective communication for the purpose of persuasion, or 
be used as mere rhetoric, to distract, confuse, obfuscate, or coerce 
the audience.  This is a lesson for all rhetoricians, those of law and 
economics and of general legal discourse. 
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 My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt 
comment, “Statistics never lie—but liars use statistics.” 
